This paper presents a model of trade that explains why …rms wait to export and why many exporters fail. Firms face uncertain demands that are only realized after the …rm enters the destination. The model retools the timing of uncertainty resolution found in productivity heterogeneity models. This retooling addresses several shortcomings. First, the imperfect correlation of demands reconciles the sales variation observed in and across destinations. Second, since demands for the …rm's output are correlated across destinations, a …rm can use previously realized demands to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations. The option to forecast demands causes …rms to delay exporting in order to gather more information about foreign demand. Third, since uncertainty is resolved after entry, many …rms enter a destination and then exit after learning that they cannot pro…t. This prediction reconciles the high rate of exit seen in the …rst years of exporting. Finally, when faced with multiple countries in which to export, some …rms will choose to sequentially export in order to slowly learn more about its chances for success in untested markets.
Introduction
Productivity heterogeneity models of international trade have gained some traction in recent years 1 . Inspired by empirical works documenting the di¤erences between …rms that do and do not export, models such as Melitz (2003) plausibly explain why only a fraction of …rms export 2 . In these models, high …xed and variable costs of exporting prevent all but the most productive …rms from exporting. This self-selection mechanism has empirical support over other explanations for …rm exporting, such as learning-byexporting. 3 However, productivity heterogeneity models cannot reconcile several recently uncovered facts. For instance, productivity heterogeneity cannot fully explain the variation of …rms sales within a destination. Since productivity is anchored to the …rm and translates monotonically to …rm sales, these models predict that variation in productivities for a set of …rms selling to a destination should fully explain the variation in sales for that set.
Recent works have found that …rm-speci…c variation accounts for less than a third of total sales variation. 4 Since productivities in Melitz (2003) are realized before the …rm supplies to any destination, a …rm that begins exporting should export immediately to all destinations and forever. This prediction is inconsistent with evidence that most …rms delay entry into exporting 5 , and that many …rms stop exporting almost immediately after they begin. 6 . As Figure 1 shows, over a third of Colombian …rm that exported in the 1980's stopped after only one year, and that the exporting hazard rate decreases with time length of export- 2 Notable works include Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Jensen (1995, 1999 ) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) . 3 See survey by Greenaway and Kneller (2007) 4 See Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2008), Lawless and Whelan (2008) , and Munch and Nguyen (2008) 5 Damijan, Kostevc, and Polanec (2006) …nd that Slovenian …rms supply domestically for two to four years before they start exporting. 6 Eaton, Enslava, Kugler, and …nd that nearly half of Colombian …rms who started exporting in 1997 stopped the following year. 7 Colombian …rm data statistics calculated by author from dataset generously provided by Jim Tybout. …rms, in which …rms slowly expand the set of destinations to which they export. 8 Insert Figure 1 here
To reconcile these patterns, I introduce a model of trade akin to Melitz (2003) with two novel contributions. The …rst is that I allow for imperfect correlation of …rm heterogeneity across destinations. I do this by interpreting the heterogeneity in demand space:
…rms face …rm-destination speci…c perceived quality draws. In Melitz (2003) , a model where the heterogeneity is perfectly correlated across destinations, …rms enter all profitable markets simultaneously. In this new model, …rms use realized demands in supplied destinations to forecast demands in unsupplied destinations. In a free entry equilibirium, the ability to forecast demands causes …rms to delay exporting in order to gather more information about foreign demand. This feature of the model reconciles the observed delays in exporting (Damijan, Kostevc, and Polanec 2006) . In a multi-country setting, this forecasting ability results in some …rms slowly adding countries to their set of exporting destinations, reconciling the pattern of sequential export expansion (Eaton, Enslava,
Kugler, and Tybout 2007).
The second di¤erence between this model and Melitz (2003) is the uncertainty resolution timing. A …rm in Melitz (2003) realizes its productivity before any supply decisions are made; the …rm perfectly forecasts pro…ts as soon as it is born. Those …rms that "fail" in Melitz never supply to any destination; they are not …rms that we can see in the sales data. The current model moves the resolution timing until after the …rm enters the destination. This results in some …rms garnering negative pro…ts. Demands are time-invariant so once the …rm supplies to the destination once, it can forecast pro…ts in that market forever. Those who garner negative pro…ts exit the destination the following period. I
term an exit after a single period a Failure. If the destination is a foreign country, I term it an Exporting Failure. This feature of the model reconciles the high initial exporting failures seen in Figure 1 .
See Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) for data details. 8 See Eaton, Enslava, Kugler, and Marketing research points to demand uncertainty as the driver of failures. Table 1 summarizes the results of marketing studies of product failures. Only one of the eight studies points to unexpected high cost as a cause of failures while all of them attribute failures to over-optimistic forecasts of market demand 9 . Unexpected high cost X Value to potential buyers was overestimated X X X X X X X X Poor planning X X X X X X Timing Wrong X X X X X Enthusiasm crowded on facts X X X X X Product failed X X X Product lacked a Champion X Company politics X Crawford (1977) Other papers have overcome the imperfect correlation of sales variation across destinations by layering additional sources of …rm-destination-speci…c heterogeneity on top of the …rm-speci…c productivity heterogeneity 10 or by layering both quality and productivity heterogeneity together 11 . This model is able to reconcile this pattern with a single source of heterogeneity.
The Melitz (2003) model cannot explain the exporting delays and exporting failures present in literature. Recent studies 12 have modeled delays and failures by adding timevarying productivity shocks. Firms experiencing these shocks oscillate back and forth 9 Marketing studies lament the persistence of high failure rates in light of 75 years of marketing advances. The …rm can spend an exorbant amount of money forecasting market demand only to produce a product that the market ultimately rejects. Recent examples include new Coke and HD-DVD. This points towards a mechanism of failure that cannot be overcome by increasing advertising or other …xed costs. 10 See for example Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) , and Das, Roberts, and .
11 e.g. Hallak and Svidasan (2008) , and Benedetti Fasil and Borota (2010). 12 See Luttmer (2004), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) , Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2005) across the exporting productivity cuto¤. These …rms start and stop exporting based on the direction of the exogenous shock. The time-varying productivity channel certainly explains some of the patterns described above, but has some shortcomings. The channel is one of exogenous shocks, so extracting implications from those models are more di¢ -cult. This paper suggests an orthogonal mechanism by which …rms decide delay and stop exporting 13 . In addition, time-varying productivity cannot reconcile why some exporters are less productive than nonexporters, which this paper can.
Instead of varying …rm heterogeneity across time, this paper varies it across destinations. Exporting failures arise, not from exogenous shocks, but because …rms do not know whether they can succeed in a destination before it is actually in that destination.
Exporting delays occur, not because …rms are waiting for exogenous shocks, but because a zero pro…t general equilibrium prevents a new …rm from supplying both home and foreign destinations immediately. It has to choose one destination. By delaying, the …rm learns more about itself before deciding whether to export. In a multicountry setting, this learning process enables some …rms to supply to single additional destination, in order to learn more about themselves before expanding further.
One additional contribution of the model is the ability to reconcile the existence of export-only …rms, which are …rms that export all of their output. Approximately one percent of American …rms in 1987 and …ve percent of Colombian …rms in the 1980's were export-only …rms 14 . The model shows how this can occur in the cases of both symmetric and asymmetric countries.
The following section presents the structure of the model. It describes an overview of the economy, and decribes the supply decisions …rms must make each period. I then restrict the model to two countries in Section 3. I show the general equilibrium testing strategies of …rms in a simple symmetric case, and present numerical results. I then extend the base model to a more general assymetric two country case and a multiple 13 There can be other explanations of exporting delay, e.g. …nancial constraints by Bellone, Musso, Nesta, & Sahiavo (2010).
14 For American …rms, see Figure 1 in Bernard and Jensen (1995) . Columbian …rm statistics calculated by author from dataset generously provided by Jim Tybout. symmetric country case. The assymetric country case shows that when one country is much larger than the other, …rms will rather sell to the larger market …rst. The multiple symmetric country case shows that some …rms will export to a subset of available untested destinations, instead of all available destinations, even if those destinations are ex ante identical.
Model Structure
The model is an extension of Krugman's (1980) The world consists J countries and an in…nite horizon of discrete time periods t.
Consumers in each country j 2 (1; :::; J) consume both a homogenous good and a differentiated good. The homogenous good is produced with a constant returns to scale production technology and traded freely. This equalizes wages across countries, which we normalize to one. We focus the rest of the exposition on the di¤erentiated good. In every country, there is a potentially limitless number of …rms that produce unique varieties of the di¤erentiated good to sell in one or more destinations 15 . Time-invariant preferences for the di¤erentiated good can be represented by the utility function u j :
where q j!t is the quantity of variety ! consumed in j at time t; > 1 is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between these varieties, and X j! is a random variable determining j 0 s time-invariant perceived quality of !: X j! can also be interpreted as the appeal, or popularity, of ! in j: Given jt , the set of varieties available to consumers in j at t; destination j 0 s demand for variety ! can be expressed as
where p j! is the destination price of variety !; Y jt is the total expenditure of j on jt ; and jt is the endogenous level of competition in j: jt is large enough to be una¤ected by a price change of any single variety !: It resembles the inverse of the usual CES price index.
Firms produce their unique varieties using a production technology that is identical across varieties. This di¤ers from Melitz (2003) , in which …rms produce using idiosyncratic technologies. The labor cost l ijt required to produce q t units of any variety from country i and supply them to destination j in period t is
That is, there are …xed costs f and marginal costs ij of supply 16 . The …rm must pay these …xed costs for each period t and each destination j to which it supplies. The destination …xed costs represent, for example, storefront rent, …xed shipping and port fees, or advertising costs 17 . The marginal costs represent, for example, variable production, transport, and tari¤ costs. All discussed variables except for x j! are known to the …rm owner at all times.
Faced with the production costs (2) and demand (1) ; the owner of a …rm ! in country i sets the price p j!t as a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
Since the optimal price is the same across all periods and varieties produced in i and sold in j; I simplify notation by de…ning p ij = 1 ij . This optimal pricing results in the period t pro…ts of
The …rm owner observes X j! only if she supplies ! to j at least once. If X j! is known, then ijt (X j! ) is perfectly forecasted for all future periods. If not, the …rm owner must decide whether to supply ! to j based on her beliefs about X j! : If the distribution from which X j! is drawn is degenerate, exp(X j! ) is constant for all varieties and can be factored out, reducing demand equation (1) to that presented in Krugman (1980) , although destination pro…t equation 4 stills di¤ers from Krugman (1980) by the f term.
I examine steady state equilibria in which aggregate market conditions do not change over time. Therefore, Y jt and jt can be characterized by Y j and j : I drop the t subscript whereever it is super ‡uous.
The Distribution of Perceived Qualities
This section discusses the multivariate random vector X ! = (X 1! ; ::; X j! ; ::X J! ) consisting of J random variables each corresponding to the perceived quality of ! in a destination.
It is a continuous random vector with a joint multivariate normal pdf 18 denote by g ( ) 19 .
For j 6 = k; X j! and X k! have the properties
where s 2 > 0 is the variance of each of the marginal distributions and 0 < < 1 is the correlation coe¢ cient. The restriction on implies that the demands in any two destinations are positively and imperfectly correlated.
Using Bayesian updating, I determine how the …rm owner forecasts perceived qualities in untested markets. To minimize confusion, I number the destinations so that …rm ! has observed perceived qualities in the …rst I destinations. Then the conditional distribution of any unknown X j! , given the vector of known perceived qualitiesx
, is normal with moments 20 :
Note that if I = 0; the moments in Equation 6 collapse to those in Equation 5.
As the number of known observations I increases, the forecasted perceived quality I! approaches the sample mean of the observed perceived qualities; the forecast gets closer to the …rm average and away from the prior. Also, as I increases, the conditional variance 2 I decreases: the forecast becomes more precise with each observation. The density of X j! givenx I ! is completely characterized by a normal distribution with a mean of I! and variance determined by I: I denote the conditional pdf as g I ( j I! ) :
In summary, the …rm owner has beliefs about her perceived quality in a destination.
These beliefs depend on both the number of destinations previsouly tested, as well as the 20 I derive this in Appendix A average of perceived qualities observed in those destinations. In each time period, the …rm owner uses these beliefs to make decisions about which destinations to supply.
Firm Decisions
At the beginning of each period t, the …rm owner must decide whether to supply to each of the j 2 (1; :::; J) destinations, using the information gleaned from having previously supplied to I of the destinations. These J decisions fall into one of two categories. First, for each of the I previously tested destinations, the …rm owner decides whether to stay and continue supplying there. Second, for each of the J I untested destinations, she decides whether to test her variety there. We examine each of these two sets of decisions.
Decision to Stay
Consider the …rm owner's decision for a destination j that she supplied to in a period before t and thus previously realized X j! = x j! : She will supply ! to j in t if the known pro…ts ij (x j! ) are positive. Rearranging equation (4) shows that ij (x j! ) > 0 only if
If x j! > x ij , the …rm makes positive pro…ts by supplying ! to j again. I term this the decision to stay in j; since the …rm has previously supplied to j: If x j! < x ij , the …rm will not supply ! to j in t or in any period after t: I term this a failure of ! in j: The stay cuto¤ x ij is the minimum perceived quality required by …rms in country i to not fail in destination j:
Decision to Test
If the variety ! has not previously been supplied to j; the …rm owner must decide whether to supply ! to j for the …rst time. I term this the decision to test ! in destination j:
The …rm owner will test j based on her expectations of the lifetime discounted sum of per-period-pro…ts. The pro…ts are discounted because the …rm faces an exogenous death rate of . For a …rm from destination i testing destination j with I known perceived qualities and a forecasted perceived quality of I! , the expected testing pro…t
Expected future period pro…ts (8) and comprises the pro…ts the …rm expects in the …rst supply period and the discounted sum of all future expected pro…ts, should the …rm realize a favorable perceived quality.
It is easier to work with the expected testing pro…t by combining Equations 4, 7 and 8 to produce
Equation 9 shows that the endogenous variable x ij completely characterizes the aggregate destination market conditions for …rm !. The interactions between destination speci…c characteristics p ij ; Y j and j in equations 4 and 7 determine x ij :
It is straightforward to show that v ijI ( ) increases with and a unique + ijI < x ij exists for each ijI triplet such that the expected testing pro…t is positive only if > + ijI 21 :
I term + ijI the testing cuto¤. It is the minimum forecasted perceived quality that a …rm from i with I previous observations requires in order to pro…tably test j:
A …rm from country i with I previous observations has J supply decisions determined by the endogenous aggregate state variables represented by the vector iI = x ij ; + ijI j2f1;:::;Jg : We can combine these state variables for all …rms with I observations into I = ( I ) i2f1;:::;Jg : Finally, we can combine all state variables for all possible I's in this economy to produce a vector characterizing this entire economy:
To be clear, in the vector ; i and j denotes speci…c countries, while I denotes the number of previously tested countries.
Two Symmetric Countries
Now that the structure of the economy has been outlined, I look at how a zero-expectedlifetime-pro…t steady-state general equilibrium will a¤ect a new …rm's testing strategy.
In this section, I examine a world consisting of two symmetric countries H (ome) and F (oreign). I normalize marginal costs to re ‡ect iceberg trade costs between the two countries:
Due to the structure of these trade costs, the stay cuto¤ for …rms exporting to destination j is greater than the stay cuto¤ those …rms located in j and selling domestically:
In this symmetric country setup, I show that the zero-expected lifetime pro…t condition will induce …rms to delay exporting. Later, I show that if one country is much larger than the other, this will entice all …rms in both countries to test the larger one …rst.
Testing Order
Consider …rm ! located in country i 2 fH; F g at time t; which hasn't tested in either destination. The …rm owner can sequentially or simultaneously the two destinations. She tests ! following one of three strategies (strategy nomenclature in parenthesis):
1(SB). Test ! in both the Home and F oreign destinations in period t: In a steady state equilibrium, the value of these strategies are determined by the aggregate state vector in Equation 11 . The value of each strategy can be expressed as V i (S; ) ; S 2 fSB; SH; SF g ; where
The second terms in (14b) and (14c) re ‡ect the discounted expectation of the value of testing the second market should the …rm owner draw a high enough perceived quality in the …rst destination.
Equilibrium
A zero-expected pro…t steady-state two-symmetric-countries equilibrium is de…ned as the aggregate variable vector~ and …rm testing strategyS such that for i = H; F :
The …rst condition states that a new …rm will choose the strategy that maximizes its lifetime expected pro…ts from testing in H and F: The second condition states that this maximum value must be zero, due to free entry. For the rest of this section, I show this equilibrium exists and is unique through a series of proofs.
Lemma 1
The destination with the lower stay cuto¤ will have a higher strategy value of testing there …rst. For example,
Proof. See Appendix C.
The probability of success in a destination, which monotonically decreases with the stay cuto¤, completely determines the expected testing pro…t in that destination, which in turn determines the strategy value of testing that destination …rst. When comparing the strategy values of two destinations, we do not have to concern ourselves with di¤erential trade costs, aggregate expenditures, or the average price competition from other varieties, as long as we know the stay cuto¤s.
Proposition 2
In an zero-expected-lifetime-pro…t symmetric equilibrium where max S V i S;~ = 0, …rms will not test both markets simultaneously: V i (SB; ) < 0:
If the lifetime value of testing a market is nonnegative, the owner would certainly test that market …rst and only test the second market if the resulting conditional lifetime value of testing the second market is positive. Since zero-expected-lifetime-pro…t is imposed, this scenario is non-existent. Firms will not sell to all markets simultaneously.
Proposition 3
In an zero-expected-lifetime-pro…t symmetric equilibrium where max S V i S;~ = 0, …rms will not test the export market …rst: V H SF;~ < 0 and V F SH;~ < 0:
Proof. Since x HF > x iF and lemma 1, V H SF;~ < V H SH;~ . Therefore, V H SF;~ cannot maximize max S V H S;~ ; and so V H SF;~ < 0: The symmetric argument applies for V F SH;~ < 0:
Firms will not test the overseas export market …rst. This is due to the added costs of exporting, which depresses expected pro…ts. Since from Proposition 2, …rms will also not test both destinations simultaneously, this leaves only one strategy: test ! in the same destination the …rm is located. I term this an exporting delay. My model provides a channel to explain why …rms delay their exporting: since exporting is so risky, …rms need to start in the safer home market to learn about their perceived quality.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique such that equililbrium is achieved.
Proof. See Appendix D If V (SH; ) > 0; …rms will introduce more new varieties. These new varieties will increase competition and lower the chances of success in both destinations. The values of testing the destinations will decrease and thus decrease the value of a new variety. This cycle will occur until the value of a new variety is driven to zero.
The model characterization of the two symmetric country equilibrium is now complete. 22 In the steady state equilibrium, new …rms arise in each period t. New …rms in H test their varieties in Home in the initial period t. In the next period t + 1, …rm owners make two parallel decisions. First, they choose to continue supplying pro…table varieties to the Home destination. Unpro…table varieties fail. Second, …rm owners choose whether to test their varieties in the foreign destination, based on their forecast of perceived quality in F oreign. In periods t + 2 and onwards, …rms have all the information they need to decide to which destination(s) they will supply. Those varieties that were tested in both markets will be continued to be supplied to where they are pro…table. This process is presented in the top half of Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 . 22 The equilibrium mass of incoming …rms can be determined by clearing the …nal goods market.
For comparison, the process in Melitz (2003) is presented in the bottom half of Figure 2 .
Using his notation, …rms pay a development cost to observe the productivity ' ! : Since ' ! is known at the beginning of t; decisions for all destinations are made immediately. Firms with high productivities will supply to both markets. Firms with mediocre productivities will supply to only the domestic market. Firms with low productivities will not supply at all -the market never sees these last …rms.
Numerical Predictions
The two-symmetric country case generates predictions consistent with the testing and failure rates of exporters. However, the normal distribution does not lend itself to closed-form expressions for these rates. Therefore, I determine equilibrium conditions numerically using model parameters taken from established empirical studies 23 . The parameters of the baseline simulation are summarized in Table 2 . show that results are robust to the choice of : As seen in equation 9, the …xed cost f can be factored out of all value equations and does not a¤ect the equilibrium cuto¤s, but 23 The Matlab Code is available from the author. The numerical integration of the bivariate normal distribution used 1,000,000 Monte Carlo evaluation points. instead scales the economy by determining, along with the labor endowment, the total number of …rms. I use f = 1, but changing f does not change the solutions. I use a baseline s 2 = 2; but this just scales the cuto¤ parameters. As such, I report equilibrium cuto¤ parameters as multiples of the standard deviation s = p s 2 :
Using only these few parameters, I can compare the results of my model to reported statistics in recent literature, as summarized in Table 3 . I repeat the exercise for = 1:3;
in case = 1:5 is an overestimate of trade costs. HF 1 < x H! < x HH , so they start exporting even though they fail the domestic market. Table 3 shows that trade costs a¤ect the number of exporters in equilibrium. To show the how a¤ects the equilibrium, I vary over the range [1:1; 2] : As seen in the right two graphs in Figure 3 , changing trade costs signi…cantly a¤ect the rates of …rms entering and exiting the foreign market.
First, we examine the top right graph to see the e¤ects of on the cuto¤s. Increasing trade costs increase the stay cuto¤ in the Foreign destination, which then increases the test cuto¤ a …rm needs in order to start exporting. The general equilibrium e¤ect of this is that fewer …rms become and stay exporters. The decrease in import competition helps new …rms, which now face a lower stay cuto¤ in the Home destination. As the top right graph shows, this decrease is a second-order e¤ect -the decrease in x HH over the range of is much less than the increases of x HF and Table 3 .
The domestic failure rate of new …rms always stays above 90% in the bottom right of 
Two Asymmetric Countries
Next I extend the baseline model to an economy of two assymetric countries. I show that if one market is much larger than the other, all …rms will test there …rst.
We analyze the testing decisions of a new …rm located in country i and introducing the variety ! in time t: The …rm has the same three testing strategies outlined in Section 3.1 with the same functional forms. Proposition 2 still applies: no …rm will test both destinations simultaneously. However, in the assymetric case, it is not certain that
The order of the four stay cuto¤s is crucial to determining equilibrium because by Lemma 1, they determine the strategies of the …rms.
From Equation 7
, we know x HF > x F F and x F H > x HH : Therefore, the three possible cuto¤ rankings are 24 1.
If an equilibrium of type 3 occurs, the …rms employ the same strategies as in the symmetric country case: i.e. H …rms employ S = SH and F …rms employ S = SF: This equilibrium is solved just as in the symmetric case above. By examining Equation 7 , we see that an equilibrium of type 2 occurs only in the very special case where
As we will see, . This event occurs with zero probability, so we do not discuss it further.
All …rms begin testing the same market Let's discuss the interesting equilibrium of type 1: the …rm faces lower stay cuto¤s in F than in H, no matter where the …rm is located. Testing is more pro…table in F; so all …rms in both countries will employ strategy S = SF: By Equation 7, this scenario exists only if 
, all …rms will test F …rst.
Proof. See Appendix.E
In this scenario, equilibrium is characterized by all …rms testing the foreign market …rst. The demand for varieties in the foreign destination is so large that even …rms in H are willing to risk exporting …rst. This may be the case for small countries exporting to the US. Firms could start up in those countries with the sole purpose of selling to US customers. Since increases the upper bound, this scenario is less likely for further away countries.
More than two Countries: Sequential Entry
I now examine predictions of my model for J > 2 symmetric countries with no trade costs. Even without trade costs to discourage immediate exporting, I show that …rms will often expand their set of supply destinations one country at a time. The structure laid out in Section 2 remains the same, except I now restrict ij = 1: Since there is no di¤erence between the costs of supplying di¤erent destinations, the term "exporting" is adjusted slightly. Therefore, I de…ne a …rm's …rst destination to which it supplies as its domestic destination, and any additional destinations as export destinations. For exposition purposes, I consider a representative …rm ! using the labor from country H who has not yet supplied to any destinations in period t:
Given our multiple destination setup, …rm ! has exponentially more testing strategies than the three presented in Section 3.1. The …rm can test up to J destinations in period t. If it tests J 1 destinations in period t; it has two strategies for period t + 1 : test or don't test the last destination. If instead it tests J 2 destinations in period t; it has four strategies for future periods: test zero, one, or both of remaining destinations in period t + 1 and then, if it tests one in t + 1; then test or don't test the …nal destination in t + 2. All in all, …rm ! has 2 J 1 total possible strategies it can pursue given J potential destinations. We have to examine this problem recursively. In the beginning of each period, the …rm knows its state variables I! and I. The …rm will choose K additional destinations to test to maximize the lifetime testing pro…ts in the remaining destinations.
I de…ne ( I! ; I) as the recursive value function for …rm !:
Since all destinations are identical, ex ante, …rms entering K new destinations choose those K destinations randomly among the remaining J I destinations. A recursive zero pro…t steady state symmetric equilibrium is de…ned as the set of value functions~ which satisfy (16) and the aggregate state vector~ which produces the initial valuẽ
That is, new …rms have a zero expected value of introducing a new product.
In this equilibrium, some …rms will choose K < J I additional destinations each period. They do not immediately export to all remaining destinations, even though these destinations are ex ante identical. I term this expansion sequential exporting. This matches the pattern of export expansion described in Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout 
Proposition 7
In any given period, there exist …rms that will not test all remaining destinations, but instead will test a subset of the remaining destinations. That is, 9 :
Proof. Consider …rm ! having tested I destinations by period t and realizing a perceived quality forecast of I! < + HjI : Firm ! will not test all remaining destinations because (J I) v j ( I! ; I) < 0: However, suppose the …rm takes the following strategy: 1. test 1 additional destination j and obtain new perceived qualities x j! : 2. If can generate the following ranking:
Therefore, those …rms with I! < < + HjI maximizes their recursive value functions by testing at least one additional destination, but not all remaining destinations.
There are a mass of …rms that, after testing I destinations, forecast negative lifetime pro…ts in every remaining destination, so testing all remaining destination is not a value-added strategy. However, some …rms garner positive recursive value functions by sequentially exporting in order to update their beliefs. Even if …rms project failures in all export destinations, the promise of future pro…t incentivises some of them to test at least one additional destination. Since destinations are ex ante identical, the …rm chooses it's next destination at random. Therefore, two …rms with identical I! and I may choose di¤erent destinations to test next.
Conclusions
In this paper, I propose a model of heterogeneous …rms that reconcile two new patterns of trade: …rms wait to export, and …rms fail at exporting. To do so, I retool the standard …rm heterogeneity model to allow for imperfect correlation of …rm heterogeneity across destinations. This retooling endogenous the delay in exporting and the failures of ex-porters. When demand is imperfectly correlated across destinations, …rms will use known demands in tested destinations to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations.
Because the exporting success of a …rm is not guaranteed by its domestic sales, this model has di¤erent policy implications than the Melitz (2003) When faced with more than two possible destinations, …rms will slowly expand their set of export destinations to take advantage of this slow learning. Another extension would heterogenize the demand correlations across destinations. This would make some destinations more attractive than others. Even without an a priori ranking of destinations, many …rms will test a subset of untested destinations even though they forecast negative pro…ts in that destination. Firm owners know they have a tiny chance of success. But the hope of future pro…ts entices …rms to enter destination markets even though they know they will probably fail. This is the motivation for many new business ventures.
APPENDICES
A Derivation: Moments of X j!
The vector X ! is normally distributed: 
where
Now,
: Since exp ( ) > 0; we only have to show
where is the standard normal pdf. Now since I z +
We can plug in = x ij and 1 to show that v ijI x ij = f exp C Proof: The ranking of stay cuto¤s determines the ranking of conditional values of testing.
First, take the di¤erence between equations 14b and 14c:
To show that both 1 and 2 are positive, we need to show that
Using the notation of Appendix B, we see that
The monotonicity of v ijI with respect to x ij ensures that if
The monotonicity of v ijI with respect to both x ij and ensures x iH > x iF =) 
Since we have shown that 
. Likewise, x F ; + ijI ; and + ijI are all subsequently de…ned by x HH : I can then rede…ne 
It is straightforward to see that the lim x HH !1 V (x HH ) = f < 0:
25 In fact, the last equation showing V a (x HH ) implies that, in order to satisfy our zero pro…t condition, the equilibrium x HH must be greater than
Part 3. V (x HH ) is decreasing with x HH : First:
The derivative of V b requires Leibnitz's Rule:
Since Ht (x HH ) = 0; and
We can also use Leibnitz's rule to …nd Similarly. We can de…ne a lower bound for H : Only …rms that obtain an X F ! >
+ iH1
will test the H destination. Therefore, the level of competition in H is 
We need to substitute in for the endogenous x HH : From the proof to Proposition 2, we know 0 > v HH0 (0). Therefore, 
